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Tobias: Tobias: Dear President Bush

MISSOURI
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 67

WINTER 2002

NUMBER 1

Dear President Bush*
CarlTobias**
Congratulations on winning an extremely close election to become the
forty-third President. Now, you must apply all ofthe political and organizational
ability exhibited in the campaign if you are to discharge successfully the
daunting responsibilities of governing. One critical duty that the Constitution
assigns the chief executive is the power to nominate and, with the Senate's
advice and consent, to appoint federal judges.' These life-tenured officials
resolve the most controversial issues of the day, implicating, for example,
abortion, the death penalty, and federalism. Judicial selection has assumed even
greater significance today in light of changed public perceptions that the courts
are increasingly the final arbiters of societal disputes, as Bush v. Gore, so
tellingly illustrates.
The opportunity to shape the bench is yours. President Bill Clinton named
half of the current appellate and district judges, as well as two Supreme Court
Justices during his tenure in office. However, ninety vacancies remained on the
lower federal courts when you were inaugurated. There also will be two
hundred additional openings in the next four years, as active Article III judges
assume senior status, resign, or die and as Congress authorizes new judicial
positions. Moreover, several Supreme Court Justices might retire. Capitalizing
on this situation will require the exercise of consummate skill because your lack
of a public mandate and the new Senate composition may exacerbate the task's
already complex nature by further politicizing it. Indeed, the facility with which
you treat the crucial responsibility to choose judges will affect profoundly both
the federal courts and your legacy.

* This

piece was written immediately after the 2000 election.
** Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. The Author wishes to thank Chris Bryant, Jay Bybee, Michael Higdon, and

Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Mike Gillooly for processing this piece, and Jim
Rogers for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are the Author's.
1. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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I. A SELECTIVE HISTORY OF MODERN FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION
When Jimmy Carter was elected president in 1976, few female and a
minuscule number of minority judges served on the federal appeals or district

bench.3 President Carter assigned the appointment of more women and
minorities a top priority and instituted special efforts to attain this objective. For
instance, he requested that senators seek out, identify, and propose female and
minority candidates, as well as create district court nominating commissions that
would facilitate their selection.4 Nearly sixteen percent of Carter appointees
were women, and more than twenty percent were minorities.5
Ronald Reagan claimed that his 1980 victory was a mandate from the

electorate to make the bench more politically conservative.6 The President
searched for and appointed many judges with those ideological views but chose
very few female or minority lawyers. In fact, less than two percent of his
appointments were African Americans.7 When your father, George Bush,
captured the White House in 1988, he honored President Reagan's commitment

3. See Robert J. Lipshutz & Douglas B. Huron, Achieving a More Representative
FederalJudiciary,62 JUDICATURE 483, 483 (1979); Elliott E. Slotnick, Lowering the
Bench or Raising It Higher?: Affirmative Action and Judicial Selection During the
CarterAdministration, I YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 270, 271 (1983).

4. See generally ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES 33-35 (1981); Federal
Judicial Selection: The Problems and Achievements of Carter's Merit Plan, 62
JUDICATURE 463 (1979) (This issue is solely devoted to President Carter's method of
federal judicial selection.).
5. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Reagan'sJudicialLegacy: Completingthe Puzzle
and'Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318,322,325 (1989) [hereinafter Goldman, Reagan's
JudicialLegacy];Carl Tobias, RethinkingFederalJudicialSelection, 1993 BYUL. REV.
1257, 1261 [hereinafter Tobias, Rethinking]. For more discussion of the Carter
Administration, see SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 236-84 (1997).
6. See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORTOFTHETWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION

60 (1988); Sheldon Goldman,

Reagan'sJudicialAppointments at Mid-term: Shaping the Bench in His Own Image, 66
JUDICATURE

334, 347 (1983).

7. See Goldman, Reagan's JudicialLegacy, supra note 5, at 322, 325; Tobias,
Rethinking, supranote 5, at 1269. For more discussion of the Reagan Administration,
see GOLDMAN, supranote 5, at 285-345; O'BRIEN, supranote 6, at 60-64.
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by moving the courts to the right! Your father named numerous relatively
conservative judges and few minorities.9 However, he did choose many women.
When Bill Clinton became president in 1992, observers found that he deemphasized political ideology, while stressing competence and diversity in the
selection process.' ° As the chief executive, Clinton appointed highly capable
judges who enhanced political, gender, and racial balance, naming
unprecedented numbers of women and minorities." Nevertheless, there were
ninety judicial vacancies at his administration's conclusion.

II. JUDICIAL SELECTION DURING THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

A. Goals and Reasonsfor Achieving the Objectives
1. Merit and Filling the Judicial Vacancies
You should formulate clear, praiseworthy selection goals. You must
emphasize merit by seeking to guarantee that nominees are extremely intelligent,
industrious, and independent; possess much integrity; and have balanced judicial
temperament. You also should strive to fill all of the current vacancies. If the
judiciary comprises exceptionally able jurists and operates with all 844 active
appeals and trial court judges whom Congress has authorized, it most effectively
can decrease the large civil backlogs in numerous districts; promptly,
economically, and equitably decide the growing, increasingly complex, civil and
criminal caseloads; and felicitously address the appellate "crisis of volume."' 2

8. Sheldon Goldman, Bush 'sJudicialLegacy: The FinalImprint,76 JUDICATURE
282,296 (1993) [hereinafter Goldman, Bush 'sJudicialLegacy];Sheldon Goldman, The
Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carryingon a Tradition,74 JUDICATURE 294, 296-98
(1991) [hereinafter Goldman, The Bush Imprint]; Tobias, Rethinking, supra note 5, at
1270-74.
9. Goldman, Bush's JudicialLegacy, supranote 8, at 296; Goldman, The Bush
Imprint, supranote 8, at 296-98; Tobias, Rethinking, supranote 5, at 1270-74.
10. See generally Sheldon Goldman & Elliott Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term
Judiciary:PickingJudges UnderFire,82 JUDICATURE 265 (1999); Carl Tobias, Filling
the FederalCourts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REv. 309 (1996); Joan Biskupic,
Clinton Given HistoricOpportunityto TransformJudiciary,WASH.POST, Nov. 19,1996,
at A19.
11. See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supranote 10, at 276-77, 281-88; Carl Tobias,
ChoosingJudges at the Close of the Clinton Administration, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 827,
839, 846 (2000) [hereinafter Tobias, ChoosingJudges].
12.

See, e.g., JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL

COURTS 103-05 (1995), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/Ilrp/CVRPGTOC.HTM;
REPORT OFTHEFEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) [hereinafter REPORTOF
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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2. Political Ideology
You also must resolve more vexing issues. One conundiun is the weight
to assign ideology. In the election, you characterized Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas as your "favorite" Justices and said that you would place
"strict constructionists" on the lower courts. 3 Some of your supporters may
consider these statements as campaign pledges to enhance balance on the bench
and to counter the ostensibly liberal views of Clinton appointees. For example,
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair at the
outset of the 107th Congress, promised during 1996 to "stand firm and exercise
the advice and consent power to insure that President Clinton [did] not pack the
judiciary with liberal activists."'" Your striking success in galvanizing
Republican support reflected the party's strong desire to recapture the White
House. Judicial selection, thus, appears to offer a politically cost-free means of
cultivating conservative constituencies. 5
Before you embrace ideology, however, consider several countervailing
factors. First, the need to offset judges whom President Clinton named seems
less than compelling. Even if the notion of "judicial activism" could be clearly
defined, it cannot be confined to these jurists or to liberals. 6 Indeed, the Justices

THE FEDERAL COURTS]; STAT. Div., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS

OF THE U.S. COURTS: 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 16, 19, 20, 23-25,
available at http://www/uscourts.gov/judbus 999/contents.html.
13. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, The 2000 Campaign: The Judiciary,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2000, at A28; David G. Savage, More Than Just the Oval Office at Stake;
Supreme Court: The Next President'sAppointments Could Shape the Outcome of
Decisionsfor Decades, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at A1; see also Jeffrey Ghannam,
Going Head to Head, 86-Oct. A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (2000) (providing similar views of
Governor Bush).
14. Neil A. Lewis, Utah SenatorScolds CriticsofProsecutorin Whitewater,N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at A12. For more analysis of Senator Hatch's role as chair, see
Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24

HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 744, 752 (1997) [hereinafter Tobias, ChoosingFederal
Judges];An Interview with Senator Orrin Hatch on Courts, Legislation, and Judicial
Nominees, THE THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1995, available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/nov95/hatch.htm.
15. Appointing conservatives is an article of faith for those with conservative
views on social issues, such as abortion and school prayer. "No more Souters" is their
rallying cry. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Clinton Warns of Bush's Effect on Supreme
Court, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2000, at Al.
16. CompareBrzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820,889

(4th Cir. 1999), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), with
Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 890 (Wilkinson, J., concurring); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Next
Court,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, § 6 (Sunday Magazine), at 74, 76, 77-78.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/6
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you favor receive trenchant criticism for being activists in the service of
conservatism. 7 Rather few Clinton appointees apparently engage in activism or
are very liberal because President Clinton de-emphasized political views, and
stressed gender and racial balance, and competence, choosing many attorneys
who had prior judicial experience."8 In fact, President Clinton described them
as "mainstream judges,"' 9 while he rejected "rigid adherence to a strict
ideological agenda 20 and liberal observers' importuning to name jurists who
would counter judges chosen by Republicans. 2' Even Senator Hatch conceded
that Carter "appointees were farther to the left" than Clinton appointees.? If you
emphasize conservatism, nonetheless, it might be justified as a foil to Clinton,
but you should expect the same criticisms that Republicans leveled at him and
that Democrats lodged at the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Excessive
reliance on ideology will provoke sharp resistance and may prove
counterproductive.
The 2000 presidential and senatorial elections comprise an equally salient
countervailing factor. One clear conclusion from your race is the absence of a
mandate,' which the even Senate split accentuates.24 In short, the presidential

17. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 112 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Bush, 531 U.S. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally SCOTT D.
GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1999); DAVID
A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E.SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE
ANTONIN SCALIA 82 (1996); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE

CONSTITUTION: TURNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK 3-5 (1990). Choosing conservative
jurists, such as Justice Scalia, who may possess less measured temperament, actually can
be less effective than naming jurists, such as Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice
William Brennan, or the Clinton appointees. For example, balanced temperament can
facilitate agreement on controversial issues.
18. See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 10, at 273-82; Tobias, Choosing
Judges, supra note 11, at 838-39, 846.
19. See Biskupic, supranote 10; see also supra notes 10-11, infra note 27, and
accompanying text.
20. See Biskupic, supra note 10; see also supra notes 10-11, infra note 27, and
accompanying text.
21. See Ted Gest, Disorderin the Courts? Left and Right Both Gripe About
Clinton's Taste in Judges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 1996, at 40; Neil A.
Lewis, In SelectingFederalJudges,ClintonHasNot Tried to Reverse Republicans,N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A20.
22. See Biskupic, supranote 10; see also supranotes 3-5 and accompanying text.
The Clinton Administration may be the first since that of Dwight D. Eisenhower to
decrease politicization ofjudicial selection.
23. President Reagan claimed that he had a public mandate to make the federal
government, in general, and the courts, specifically, more conservative. See supranote

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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results afford no mandate to choose conservatives, and the Senate returns leave
little flexibility, while both phenomena dictate that you proffer compromise
nominees. Thus, you should treat your statements about favorite Justices and
strict constructionists as campaign rhetoric, not ironclad pledges, and you,
therefore, should de-emphasize ideology.
3. Diversity
Similarly complex is the relevance that you should accord gender and racial
diversity. Observers criticized your non-judicial appointments in Texas because
they included few too women and minorities.' This charge mirrors criticisms
directed at Presidents Reagan and Bush for selecting tiny numbers of minority
lawyers. Do not forget that your father named many women,26 while President
Clinton chose unprecedented numbers of female and minority counsel.27 These
efforts offset somewhat the racial imbalance that the Republican administrations
maintained and the lack of gender diversity perpetuated by President Reagan.
Nevertheless, disparities remain.
There are several important reasons why you should appoint more women
and minorities. First, female and minority jurists can enhance their colleagues'
understanding of complex issues, such as abortion and discrimination, which the
bench addresses.28 Second, female and minority judges will reduce gender and
racial bias in the courts.29 Moreover, selection of these jurists would be a sign

6 and accompanying text.
24. This changed when Senator Jeffords became an independent. David Rogers,
Sen. Jeffords Defects from GOP, CreatingEra of 'Tripartisanship',WALL ST. J., May

25, 2001, at A16.
25. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, The 2000 Campaign: Running Texas, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 16, 2000, at A 1; supranotes 7 & 9. But see Ghannam, supranote 13, at 43;

but cf Jeffrey Toobin, Women in Black, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2000, at 77 (discussing

conservative female judges in Texas).
26. See, e.g., Goldman, Bush's JudicialLegacy, supra note 8, at 286; Tobias,
Rethinking, supra note 5, at 1273; see also Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal
Judges, 43 FLA. L. REv. 477, 477 (1991) [hereinafter Tobias, More Women].
27. See, e.g., supra notes 10-I1.

28.

See, e.g., Marion Z. Goldberg, Carter-AppointedJudges-Perspectiveson

Gender, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 108; Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative
Action for the Judiciary?,62 JUDICATURE 488, 494 (1979); Slotnick, supra note 3, at
272-73.
29. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 12, at 169; NINTH
CIRCUITTASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS & ETHNIC FAIRNESS, FINAL REPORT (1997),
available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/OCELibra.nsf/eb93ae8ffblfcb
7488256394006a5c7e/5925a569c39bbbff882564e70002017d/$FILE/finalrep.pdf; Lynn

Hecht Schafran, GenderBias in the Courts: An EmergingFocusforJudicialReform,21
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/6
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of your commitment to improving conditions for women and minorities in the
nation, in the justice process, and in the legal practice. The public also has
greater confidence in a bench whose composition reflects that of the society. 0
You must attempt to fill all ninety openings with highly competent judges
who increase gender and racial diversity. Once you have canvassed potential
selection goals thoroughly and enunciated clear, laudable objectives, you should
develop efficacious measures to realize them.
B. Proceduresfor Achieving Your Goals
In the campaign, you promised to reduce partisan bickering and to urge
Senate action on nominees within sixty days ofnomination." These are worthy
ideals, although certain political and institutional realities might frustrate their
achievement. For instance, some individuals and entities participating in
selection consume much time. Resource and related intrinsic limitations mean
that Federal Bureau of Investigation "background checks," American Bar
Association ("ABA") Standing Committee on Judiciary qualification ratings, and
Judiciary Committee candidate investigations may slow efforts to process
nominees.32 Relatively arcane operating procedures and the press of other
business could preclude completion of Senate scrutiny in two months.33
Furthermore, senators from the areas with vacancies can veto consideration;
unanimous consent permits one member to delay floor action, and cloture
requires sixty votes. Despite these obstacles, you can foster incremental
improvement by attempting to set deadlines, streamline nominee evaluation, and
promote bipartisanship through cultivation of Democrats.34

ARIz. ST. L.J.

237, 238 (1989).

30. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Carter'sJudicialNominees, 62
JUDICATURE 246, 253 (1978); Slotnick, supra note 3, at 272-73; Tobias, Rethinking,
supra note 5, at 1276. The facility with which your administration resolves this issue
also might indicate how inclusive your presidency will be.
31. See, e.g., Maria L. LaGanga, Bush Vows to Cure a DysfunctionalD.C., L.A.
TIMES, June 9,2000, at A14; Governor Bush Delivers Remarks on Government Reform
at Knoxville Event (June 8, 2000) (transcript available through the Federal Document
Clearing House, available at http://www.fdch.com/net4.html).
32. See, e.g., Gordon Bermant et al., JudicialVacancies: An Examinationof the
Problemand PossibleSolutions, 14 MIss. C. L. REV. 319, 333-37 (1994); Carl Tobias,
FederalJudicialSelection in a Time ofDivided Government,47 EMORYL.J. 527,532-39

(1998).
33. A trenchant example was the need to respond to the September 11 terrorist
attacks.
34. For valuable, recent proposals that could facilitate selection, see Thomas 0.
Sargentich, Report of the Task Force on FederalJudicial Selection of Citizens for
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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1. General Procedures
First, you publicly must announce your goals and practices. Clearly
explaining the ideas will inform those involved in selection and the public, and
it should facilitate appointments. You must decide what responsibility to lodge
in the White House and the Department of Justice, as well as how much to honor
the preferences of senators from states where openings arise. Presidents Clinton,
Bush, and Reagan left control over all Supreme Court and most appellate
nominees in the White House, deferred to senators on many district court
vacancies, and assigned to the Department of Justice major responsibility for
investigating attorneys once they became serious candidates.3" The choice of
Justices and circuit judges deserves little analysis, as you probably will maintain
control over selection. For example, White House Counsel should ensure that
staff understands your objectives and employs the best means to attain them.
The choice of Justices also will depend on unpredictable factors, such as who
resigns and whether it is an election year, but the appointments' significance and
their potential to consume already scarce resources for lower court recruitment
require that you plan for this contingency by compiling a "short list" of strong
candidates. Because recent administrations with diverse philosophies found
similar measures effective, dramatic change is not indicated.
You must work closely with the Senate Judiciary Committee, which
exercises primary responsibility for the confirmation process; its Chair; and
specific Senate members. For instance, the Chair could be a valuable ally, as he
schedules nominee committee hearings and votes, and can affect floor action on
lawyers whom the panel approves. You should seek his counsel freely on the
confirmation process and particular candidates. Informal consultation also will
improve selection. Thus, before actually nominating candidates, you should
solicit views of the Chair, and from influential senators and lawmakers from
areas where seats open. Remember to enlist aid from the Senate Majority
Leader, who controls floor consideration of nominees and has keen appreciation
of the chamber's operations.
You should attempt to derive instructive insights from history. For
example, consultation has facilitated confirmation during most recent
presidencies. Moreover, Republicans blamed delay on submission immediately
before Senate recesses of many Clinton nominees, some of whom the thenmajority found unacceptable; these phenomena purportedly frustrated committee
review.36 Your administration can avoid this situation by steadily tendering

Independent Courts,51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1031, 1038-43 (1999); EliminatingUnnecessary
Delays in FillingFederalJudicial Vacancies, 83 JUDICATURE 100, 100 (1999).
35. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERALAPPOINTMENTS PROCESS 124-

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/6
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manageable numbers of well-qualified candidates. You correspondingly might
seek the advice of officials who have helped recruit judges since 1989?'
Keep in mind your presidency's rather nascent status and the role of
politics, which suffuses the appointments process. Do not forget that selection
will proceed slowly and receive close attention, especially at your
administration's outset. Thus, you should evaluate politics' effects, especially
on the choice ofnominees. Newly-elected chief executives also have-a reservoir
of goodwill and exercise much authority when naming judges, but they have
finite political capital to spend on the appointments.38 Remember that a single
controversy involving selection can derail the whole process, as recent disputes
demonstrate.3 9
2. Special Efforts to Increase Diversity
You should pursue a course of action that will enhance gender and racial
balance. One helpful starting point is yourpredecessors' endeavors. You should
assess salutary ways to redouble the efforts of the first Bush and the Clinton
Administrations. For example, each President wrote the senators in his political
party, encouraging them to suggest women.40 The choice of district court
nominees requires more specific analysis, as recent chief executives have
deferred to lawmakers where vacancies arose.4' You might ask Senate members

25,333 (2000); Tobias, ChoosingJudges,supranote 11, at 843; Orrin G. Hatch, Judicial
Nominee ConfirmationsSmootherNow, DALLASMORNINGNEWS, June 27, 1998, at 9A;
see also Goldman & Slotnick, supranote 10, at 268, 271-73.

37. Examples are Clinton Administration Assistant Attorney General Eleanor
Dean Acheson and Deputy White House Counsel Bill Marshall, as well as Bush
Administration White House Counsel Boyden Gray.
38. For the idea that President Clinton spent little political capital on selection,
especially on controversial candidates, see Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 10, at 270;
Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World ofJudicialConfirmation in the Era ofHatch
andLott, 103 DICK. L. REv. 247,315-22 (1999); Ana Puga, Clinton JudicialPicks May
Court the Right, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1994, at 1.
39. These involved vacancies in the Utah district court and on the Federal Election
Commission. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S4366 (daily ed. May 24, 2000); Lizette
Alvarez, SenateDealEndsLogjam on Nominees andJudges,N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2000,
at A19; Dan Carney, Clinton'sDeals with GOP on Judgeships Stir DiscontentAmong
Democrats,57 CONG. Q. WKLY. 845 (Apr. 10, 1999); David G. Savage, FederalBenches
Left Vacant Over Utah Tug of War, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1999, at Al.
40. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Unmaking the G.O.P. Court Legacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1993, at A10 (providing Clinton's request); Tobias, More Women, supranote
26, at 479-80 (providing Bush's request).
41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. The president traditionally has

retained virtually exclusive control over selection for the Supreme Court and much
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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to institute new or apply existing approaches, such as district judge nominating
panels, which will delineate, and foster the selection of, female and minority
counsel.42 Senators and your assistants could enlist aid from traditional entities,
such as bar associations, and less conventional ones, including women's and
minority political groups, to identify promising candidates. You also must seek
help from all thirteen female members of the Senate who can urge their
colleagues to propose and promote confirmation of women and minorities. As
essential will be the capabilities and networking of female and minority
attorneys, who now constitute more than a quarter of the American bar; of
women and minorities in your Cabinet; and of Martha W. Barnett, the ABA
president.
3. Other Specific Action
You should assess, and perhaps invoke, other actions that will permit you
to fill each empty seat and to name more female and minority judges. One direct
measure would be to nominate talented candidates, numbers of whom are
women and minorities, for the openings. If Democratic senators do not
cooperate, you could force the issue by using the presidency as a bully pulpit to
criticize them. A second idea is orchestrating the passage ofa bill that authorizes
newjudgeships.43 You can justify this approach because the Judicial Conference
premises recommendations for additional positions on carefully-calibrated
estimates of judges' workloads and court dockets," both of which have
expanded since 1990 when Congress last enacted comprehensive legislation.4"

control over selection for the appeals courts. See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
42. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
43. See S. 3071, 106th Cong. (2000); S. 1145, 106th Cong. (1999); see also
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2001 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERALJUDICIARY, available
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/ 2001year-endreport.htnl. See
generally Tobias, Choosing FederalJudges, supra note 14, at 749; Can the Federal
Courts Cope Without More Judges?,THE THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1999, at 1, availableat
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/nov99ttb/ope.html; JudicialConference-Asks Congressfor
New Judgeships, THE THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 2000, at 2, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/aug00ttb/judconf.html.
44. See, e.g., JUD. CONF. OFTHEU.S., PROCEEDINGS OFTHEJUDICIALCONFERENCE

21-23 (Mar. 16, 1999); Tobias, ChoosingFederalJudges,supranote 14, at 753. Butsee
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF
JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (Mar. 8, 1999), available at

http://www.senate.gov/-grassley/releases/I 999/p9r03-07.htn#chrpt; J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, The Drawbacksof Growth in the FederalJudiciary,43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1161-63

(1994).
45. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Title II, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); see also supra note 12 (affording
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/6
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You even might allow the Democrats to suggest some nominees in return for
confirmation of Republican candidates or approval of a judgeships statute.
Indeed, one bold compromise would be resubmitting particular Clinton nominees
or elevating certain ofyour predecessor's district court appointees. Remember,
President Clinton named Roger L. Gregory as the first African-American
member of the Fourth Circuit through a recess appointment.47 The Democratic
chief executive concomitantly placed on the appeals courts Ann Claire Williams
and Sonia Sotomayor, whom Presidents Reagan and Bush had named to the
district bench. 8

I. CONCLUSION
Now that you have entered the White House, attention must focus on the
formidable duties of governing. Judicial selection is one area in which your
presidency will receive much scrutiny. The development of clear goals and
efficacious procedures for securing those objectives will facilitate the
appointment of excellent judges, many of them women and minorities, to all
ninety vacancies. How carefully you discharge this complex, delicate task may
be a critical test of your administration's political and organizational skills.

the relevant docket data). See generally GERHARDT, supranote 36, at 302 &n.38.
46. See Goldman &Slotnick, supranote 10, at 271; see also S. 1145, 106th Cong.
(1999). Passing a statute may be fruitless, absent an improved confirmation process. See
Bermant et al., supra note 32, at 320-23; Tobias, More Women, supranote 26.
47. See President William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Recess Appointment of
Roger L. Gregory to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and an
Exchange with Reporters, in 36 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 3163,3180 (Dec. 27,2000);
Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Names a Black Judge; Skirts Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,

2000, at Al; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 3; United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d
1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). See generallyThomas
A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical
Practicein ConstitutionalInterpretation,84 COLUM.L. REv. 1758 (1984). You astutely

renominated Judge Gregory, whom the Senate confirmed in 2001.
48. See Tobias, Choosing Judges, supra note 11, at 841-42, 846. You wisely
nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Judge Barrington Parker for the Second Circuit in
2001. President Clinton had appointed Judge Parker to the Southern District of New
York. Chief Justice William Rehnquist recently urged the Senate to expedite the
confirmation process and Congress to pass ajudgeship bill. See REHNQUIST, supranote
43.
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